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Summary: 
Different authors show opposing results concerning the relationship between national and 
European identities. This article confirms empirically that identification with Europe is 
directly and yet paradoxically related to national identifications. It also shows that the 
relationship established between these two identifications has changed over the last two 
decades in a consistent way. The changes in this relationship are interpreted as a consequence 
of the dual process at stake when people identify with a territorially based community. The 
first process refers to the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to 
feel like a member of a community rather than an isolated individual: it is cumulative as far as 
identification with nations and with Europe is concerned. The other dimension, on the 
contrary, is exclusive: it results from the sociological and political process of community 
building which is made easier by the delimitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by 
pointing out some significant ―other‖ such as the European Union. These two processes 
interact in such a way that the relationship between the two levels of identification is often 
difficult to spot which explains why there is considerable debate on whether a strong sense of 
national identity leads the way to European identity or prevents it.  
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 For a long time, support for European integration could be analyzed without much 
reference to the attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring 
acknowledgement of a strong social determination in attitudes towards Europe, analysts did 
observe important differences in support among European countries, but these were 
considered as encompassing all sorts of differences in the countries themselves. There was no 
need to infer major differences in the ways the different peoples of Europe related to their 
own country.  
Nowadays, most European Union analysts consider that the growing process of 
European integration has changed the very nature of attitudes towards Europe. From 1994 
onwards and the establishing of European citizenship, it has been argued that support for the 
European Union should be analyzed as a European identity-building process rather than as a 
set of tolerant attitudes towards a remote and foreign object as used to be the case. Hence, the 
question of the relationship between support for the European Union and the commitment of 
European citizens to their own country can no longer be avoided (Diez Medrano 2003). This 
article will examine the changing relationship between national and European commitment 
since 1982. This relationship will in turn be apprehended through the notions of national 
identification and identification with Europe.  
 
Concepts and definitions 
 
The notion of identity has been deeply criticized in political science
2
 because of the 
diversity of meanings and uses (Brubaker & Cooper 2000) associated with it. However, as 
suggested by the work of Charles Tilly, it is undoubtedly preferable to ―get identity right‖ and 
to remember that ―identities are social arrangements‖, and consequential ones, resulting from 
collective negotiations about who people are (Tilly 2003, p. 608) rather than renouncing the 
notion. At a collective level, identity – and in this case national identity – can thus be 
considered as a complex pattern of meanings and values related to the group whose borders 
are defined by the state’s capacity to intervene and which underlies the varied representations 
and attitudes of the citizens towards each other and towards others (Duchesne, 2003). At an 
individual level, identity is taken to be a continuous (re)combination of different 
identifications, that is, of changing but relatively persistent patterns of references to potential 
groups of belonging (Duchesne & Scherrer 2003). The notion of identification used in this 
text represents the link between an individual and the other members of one of his/her many 
potential groups of reference. Individuals identify with different groups and, while they 
therefore have different identifications, they have only one identity which may change to a 
certain extent over time but which is considered to be basically stable. So the notion of 
identification with the nation or with Europe only refers to whether somebody does in fact 
feel related to the national or European people, whether they feel concerned by what happens 
to them, and whether they feel themselves to be part of this citizenry. An individual‘s identity 
combines national and European identification with many other possible identifications with 
groups defined on varied bases such as gender, generation, race, social class, language, 
geography, ideology, interests, etc.  
The focus here will be restricted to the way in which identification with the nation and 
with Europe relate to each other. A similar point – the observation that an individual identity 
is the combination of belonging to diverse groups – is made by most analysts of what they 
nevertheless call European identity (see for example Castano 2004 or Bruter 2005). The 
choice has been made here to differentiate between identity and identification for conceptual 
clarity. The distinction is important as the term identification includes the idea that existing 
senses of belonging at both national and European level will/may change in the middle-term. 
The notion of consistent feelings of belonging
3
 is relevant when referring to nations as they 
are old enough for this to the case. However,, the EU is probably still too young to have 
aroused deep and consistent feelings of belonging among the majority of its citizens. Writing 
about European identity may be misleading; identification with Europe rightly emphasizes 
that it is the process itself which is under discussion here. 
 
Current Alternative Hypotheses 
 
Different hypotheses may be considered regarding how the relationship between 
national and European identification may develop over time. Generally speaking, the old 
dream of the EU founding fathers was to see citizens identify more and more with Europe and 
eventually cease to identify with their own nations – a transfer of attachment which was 
expected to ward off the nationalist conflicts and wars which have cast a shadow over the 
continent for several centuries. For the time being, this dream has been proved to be partly 
inaccurate as revealed by a revival of nationalism in conflicts following the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe, or the long-standing electoral success of 
nationalist parties in Western Europe. However, there exist at least three alternative 
hypotheses on the way identification with Europe is increasing in a context of persistently 
strong national identifications.  
Firstly, some scholars believe that the European Union has marked the start of a new 
kind of political system which is free from any kind of exclusive commitment on the part of 
its citizens – be it because of the development of a basic global solidarity or because of the 
transformation of political decision systems from governments to multi-level governance 
(Meehan 1996; Wiener 1998; Ferry 1998; Neveu 2000; Habermas 2001; Nicolaidis & 
Weatherill 2003). If this is the case, then identification with Europe – more precisely in this 
sense identification with the European Union – would be a unique process, based on different 
kinds of feelings of belonging than existing identification with a nation. If this hypothesis is 
valid, indicators of national and European identification should be statistically unrelated 
(hypothesis one).  
Alternatively, other researchers continue to believe that identification with Europe is 
developing similarly to the way in which identification with nations developed in the 19
th
 
century. They expect feelings of belonging to Europe to be very similar in nature to the way 
citizens who identify with their nation relate to it. Such feelings are moreover considered 
necessary to legitimate the (European) political system and to give rise to much-needed 
political participation, more particularly, electoral participation. In this case, there are two 
possibilities. Nations may either be considered to be standing in the way of European 
integration because the two levels of government tend to compete with each other for the 
loyalty of European citizens (Dogan 1994; Mayer 1997; Carey 04; McLaren 06): here, one 
would expect a negative and significant statistical relationship between indicators of 
European and national identification (hypothesis two).  
Or, on the other hand, Europe is seen rather as a complement to the nations, an 
empowerment. Nations thus constitute a kind of model, an incentive framework of ‗we-
feeling‘ which encourages citizens to feel and act as members of a political community 
(Duchesne & Frognier 94, 02; Schild 2001, Citrin & Sides 2004; Diez-Medrano 03; Bruter 
05). In this latter case, one would expect a positive and significant statistical relationship 
between indicators of European and national identities (hypothesis three).  
 
As the references cited indicate, these three hypotheses are indeed supported by existing 
literature. The first hypothesis is mainly discussed from a theoretical point of view, but 
empirical evidence is provided for the other two. This means that researchers using empirical 
data have proved that national and European identifications tend to be both antagonist and 
cumulative. Although they focus on support for European integration rather than on 
identification with Europe, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks draw a similar conclusion 
concerning the effect of national feelings: ―The paradox that we identified earlier is apparent: 
national identity contributes to and diminishes support for European integration‖ (Hooghe & 
Marks 2004, p.417) They suggest that this is due to the various ways national identity may be 
constructed and mobilized by political elites. The aim of this paper is first to confirm and then 
complement their interpretation of this apparent paradox.  
 
Indicators and Methodology 
 
Identification refers to in-depth attitudes as opposed to mere opinions; thus, a complex 
variety of indicators should ideally be used when working on identification. This would allow 
a distinction to be made between the different dimensions at work in the constitution of 
attitudes towards Europe and its nations. To what extent do citizens‘ attitudes towards Europe 
and their nation embody a true feeling of belonging? To what extent are these attitudes 
dependent on cognition and evaluation? To what extent are they a consequence of more 
general political orientation? In what way do they reflect extraneous dispositions to 
xenophobia and/or open-mindedness and tolerance? In order to establish the true extent of 
belonging as measured by declaration of support for the European Union, one needs 
indicators which account for a certain degree of stability in the attitude measured and its 
relative independence from current affairs. The analysis of such a topic is hence strongly 
dependant on available data. Like most researchers working on European attitudes, we will 
use Eurobarometer surveys which, although they are not as complete as we would like, are the 
only data available and the only data to cover all EU countries throughout the period of time 
under study. 
Until very recently, the level of identification with the nation was measured by the 
question asked periodically about national pride. Fortunately, this question was precisely the 
one that Michelat and Thomas showed in France, in the sixties, to be the most suitable for 
measuring the feeling of belonging to the national group
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 - a feeling which they proved to be 
relatively independent from the other two main dimensions of national identification: the 
feeling that one‘s nation is superior and the attachment to the nation‘s sovereignty. In their 
data, these other two dimensions were highly dependent on a general ideological structure 
(right/left) contrary to the feeling of belonging to the nation. 
Measuring the level of identification with Europe is somewhat more complicated. 
Commission surveys have always asked a series of questions, called ―trend questions‖, in 
order to measure public opinion on the European integration process. Very few of them 
however, are related to the affective dimension of individual relationships with the 
community. During the eighties
5
, they regularly asked one question on respondents‘ 
awareness of being European citizens. This question was worded in such a way that 
identification with the European Community was implicitly considered complementary to 
identification with one‘s nation. It was abandoned in 1992 and replaced by another built on 
the idea of a possible exclusiveness of the two
6
. This unfortunate change makes it difficult to 
assess whether and if so how the Maastricht Treaty and public debate about its ratification 
have transformed the relationship between national and European identification
7
. Moreover, 
the answers to this latter question are far from being as stable as a measure of identification 
should be. However, given the absence of other questions or datasets covering the same range 
of countries and time periods, an attempt will be made here to draw some inferences from this 
survey series over the last twenty years. Since 2000, other questions have been introduced and 
these will be used to confirm our analysis. 
Of course, skeptical readers of quantitative survey analyses may wonder about the 
validity of using questions and notions that probably take on rather different meanings in each 
of the countries studied, as Juan Diez Medrano clearly showed for Spain, Germany and the 
UK in Framing Europe (2003). We will apply what Jan Van Deth names an ―inferential 
strategy‖ (J. Van Deth 1998, p.1-20): if consistency in the relations between our dependant 
variables (internal consistency) and others (external consistency), can be observed in the 
different countries, the questions will be considered to have at least one common dimension 
of meaning - a dimension that allows comparative analyses to be made - despite the various 
significations that Europe and the nation may have in the many countries of the sample. 
Concretely, this means that there will be no attempt to analyze and compare developments 
and changes in the levels of answers to questions on national pride and European 
identification. The analysis will instead focus on their statistical relationship. , If some kind of 
consistency in these relations over time can be demonstrated, the hypothesis that the indicator 
is valid will become even more plausible. 
 
Assessing the Paradoxical Relationship between National and European Identification 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 provides the correlations
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 between national pride and the corresponding 
measure of identification with Europe – namely ―how often do you think of yourself as not 
only national but also European‖ through to 1988, and then ―if you think of yourself in the 
near future as national only, national and European, European and national or only European‖ 
from 1994 onwards – for each country and each survey. For the first years of analysis, the 
results are fairly clear: there is hardly any statistical relationship between the two indicators. 
The data clearly demonstrate that when someone says they are very proud of their nationality, 
they are not less likely to feel European. In 1982, in the few cases where Kendall‘s tau-b is 
statistically significant – Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and Luxemburg – the 
relationship is such that the more someone says that they are proud of their country, the more 
often they are likely to think of themselves as European also (see also Duchesne & Frognier 
1994).  
In 1992, the indicator of identification with Europe changed. The old and the new 
questions (whether people feel not only national but also European and whether they see 
themselves as national and/or European in the near future) were asked in the same survey, but 
not the question on national pride. Therefore, the impact of the change of question on the 
measure of the relationship between national and European identification cannot be evaluated. 
However, in 1994 the interviewees were asked again both about national pride and the 
likelihood of their feeling European, using the new indicator. A significant negative 
relationship shows up in most of the countries studied (except for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal)
9
.  
In 1997, a first quick look at the data confirms the antagonism trend: on the whole, in 
the weighted dataset, 54 % of the people saying that they there are very proud of their nation 
see themselves as only national in the near future, with only 43 % of the people saying that 
they are rather proud, and 38 and 40% of those that are not very or not proud at all. But a 
closer look at the data set shows that this relationship is not stable from one country to the 
other. In the two-thirds of countries where the correlation is negative, it is fully significant 
only in France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Sweden and West Germany. Moreover, in five 
other countries, namely Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the relationship is 
different. Despite the antagonism implied by the question between thinking of oneself more as 
national than European or vice-versa, most people in these five countries who tend to feel 
more European than national nevertheless feel proud or very proud of their nations. The 
correlation computed on the European sample is thus partially an artifact. This serves as a 
reminder of the danger of analyzing European data as a whole, without referring to the 
particular structure of territorial identities in each country, as national differences remain very 
important. 
While until 1988, the available data tend to support the thesis that identification with 
Europe is independent from national identification, data from 1994 on suggests a (growing?) 
antagonism between these two levels of identification. Different authors have analyzed the 
1994 data as proof of change in the nature of identification with Europe: it would appear that 
the Maastricht Treaty turned mere opinions on a remote and vague object (the EC) into a real 
process of identity building, potentially conflicting with other allegiances (Mayer 1997; 
Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson 1998, Dupoirier et alii 2000). The question arises as to how the 
negative and significant correlations of 1994 can best be explained and whether this might be 
linked to the change of question about identification with Europe or a change in the very 
nature of identification with Europe. A third hypothesis is also possible: the change of 
context. In 1994, European elections took place following the ratification and the coming into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty. During that period, nationalist political forces, what the French 
now call ―sovereignist‖, did their best to make themselves heard and understood. The impact 
of nationalist arguments in electoral rhetoric may account for the strength of the correlations 
observed in the 1994 data. Their ensuing weakness could then be explained by the diminution 
of public debate as the electoral campaign became more distant. If this interpretation is valid - 
if the antagonism between national and European identification was significantly due to the 
electoral context of 1994 - the same kind of effect should be observable during similar 
contexts, as long as the corresponding survey questions are available. 
Since 1999, the two basic questions – on national pride and whether people feel national 
and/or European – have been asked every year. Moreover, immediately after the following 
European election which took place in Spring 1999, they were present in three surveys in a 
row: Autumn 1999, Spring 2000, and Autumn 2000. It is therefore possible to compare 
changes in correlations for the period 1994/1997.  
In 1999, another year with European elections, a rather strong negative relationship 
between the two questions can be observed, as in 1994. For the whole (weighted) sample, 
58% of the people saying that they were very proud of their country think of themselves in the 
near future as national only, while this is the case for 41% only of those who say they are 
fairly proud of their country, and 38% and 37% respectively of those not very proud or not 
proud at all of their country. Furthermore, the relationship is equivalent, negative and 
significant, for almost all countries (except Belgium, Finland and Portugal). This pattern of 
relationship continues in Spring 2000: again, there is more than 20% difference in the 
proportion of people thinking of themselves in the near future as national only (which means 
that they do not think of themselves as Europeans at all) depending on whether they are very 
proud or not of their country (56% of the very proud as against 35% of the rather proud and 
34% of both the not very and not proud at all). The relationship is significantly negative in 
almost all countries, except Finland (again) and Italy. 
But things had become slightly different by Autumn 2000. People saying they were 
very proud of their country were still more likely to think of themselves as only national, but 
the difference was much smaller (6 points instead of 17 in 1999 and 21 in Spring 2000). 
Perhaps more importantly, the relationship became more varied across countries. It is fully 
significant in eight cases out of seventeen – mainly the same as in 1997 (West Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Sweden) plus Denmark, Spain and the 
Netherlands. In the other countries, the relationship became insignificant and the minus even 
became a plus in Portugal and Finland. It would appear therefore that the same effect as in 
1994 can be observed in 1999: public debate on the EU had an important influence on the 
nature of the relationship between identification with one‘s nation and with Europe. In this 
context, being very proud of one‘s nation tends to prevent feelings of being European while 
this is not the case when public debate fades. Of course, the time periods between the surveys 
in the two cases analyzed are very different, which makes the interpretation less certain. 
However, the effect remains nonetheless striking. 
In 2001, 2002 and 2003, when the two relevant questions were asked again, the 
correlation between them increased again considerably. In 2002, Kendall‘s tau-B reached 
either its highest level or levels similar to those in 1994 and early 2000 everywhere, except in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland.
10
 It remains quasi stable in 2003 for most countries. These 
strong negative correlations from 2001 onwards confirm our interpretation of the preceding 
fluctuations in the relationship between national and European identification according to the 
intensity of the debate on Europe. During this period, the Euro was introduced in twelve 
European countries and this brought the EC back to the forefront of public debate. This 
occurred at the same time as the European Convention and the debate on the ratification of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
The pattern of correlations observed between the two variables displays a high degree of 
consistency: the shape of the correlations curve is very similar from one country to the other 
(cf. chart 1) – which is absolutely not the case for correlations between national pride and 
trend indicators of support for European integration
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. This validates a changing relationship 
between feelings of national identification and identification with Europe: when Europe is not 
a matter of public debate, the indicators show the two types of belonging – national and 
European – to be rather independent from one another. Moreover, considering that the 
question on identification with Europe implies an antagonism between the two levels, the two 
identifications could thus even be considered slightly cumulative. However, when public 
debate focuses on the EC because of European elections, ratification of treaties or indeed the 
introduction of the Euro, strong national pride seems to hamper the growth of identification 
with Europe. As Europe evolves from a remote and administrative loosely identified object to 
a concrete and political system, this second configuration tends to be the norm. 
 
CHART 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This changing and confusing relationship between national pride and identification with 
Europe could be interpreted as evidence of the superficiality of attitudes towards Europe and 
the strength of the influence of elites on the way in which citizens see themselves – which is 
one way of interpreting G. Marks and L. Hooghe explanation of the paradoxical influence of 
national identity on attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2004). 
However, another interpretation might be suggested here. Rather than being a result of the 
strong influence of elites on attitudes which are essentially weak, it could be seen as a 
consequence of the complexity of identification processes. In the next section, further 
evidence of this complexity will be given by looking at other indicators of relationships to 
Europe and the nation, and by suggesting a possible explanation: the duality of territorial 
identification. 
 
National or European Identification: Different Processes at Stake 
 
Since Autumn 2000, the Eurobarometer surveys have also asked people about the extent 
to which they feel proud of being European, and clearly, except in the United Kingdom, 
Northern Ireland and Greece, being proud of one‘s nation is far from being incompatible with 
being proud of being European (see table 2). In all four surveys more than 80% of the people 
on average who say they are very proud of being European also answer that they are very 
proud of their nation. About two thirds of the respondents indicating that they are very proud 
of their country are also very or fairly proud of being European. Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland are the only places where the majority of respondents who say that they are very 
proud of their country also say that they are not proud of being European. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is difficult to understand why, using the same dataset over the same time period, there 
is evidence of a negative relationship between national pride and European identification for 
almost every country, except the UK and Greece, even though national and European pride 
are clearly positively related. How can a relationship appear to be so highly dependent on the 
way it is measured and yet be so consistent in the way it changed over the last two decades? 
The following explanation seems the most likely. The strength of the contextual effect on the 
changing relationship between national pride as well as the powerful effect of the different 
measures of identification with Europe are a consequence of the duality of the relationship 
between national and European identification. This duality is basically a characteristic of the 
very notion of territorial identification itself. To identify oneself with one‘s nation or any 
other group defined by a territory implies two different processes. First, it assumes a natural 
tendency to identify with a group. Secondly, it implies the propensity to identify with the 
specific group defined by this specific territory. At the European level, these two processes of 
identification may generate contradictory relationships with former national identification: the 
two levels are generally cumulative when the tendency to identify with a group is concerned; 
and potentially competitive when the disposition to identify with a specific territorial 
community is at stake. When observed with aggregated data, the interference between these 
two processes gives rise, to the paradoxical statistical relationship between measures of 
identification with the nation and with Europe.  
The first process – the natural tendency to identify with a group - is challenged by the 
growing individualism of modern societies. Norbert Elias (1991) has shown how the recurrent 
shift of the social survival unit from the very local to the nation, then to the continent and 
perhaps even mankind, has resulted in a growing level of individualism. However, the last 
two decades have shown that the nation, however abstract or constructed it may be, still 
generates strong feelings of belonging. It seems to remain a very effective source of group 
identification, of self-representation as a group member, which fuels we-feelings in other 
groups, especially in other territories which have an embedded relationship with the nation. In 
this process of ‗we-building‘, national and European identifications are cumulative: both 
geographers and political scientists refer to them as ―nested‖ identities (Herb & Kaplan 1999; 
Risse 2003; Medrano & Gutiérrez 2001). 
The second process, which implies the propensity to identify with the specific group 
defined by a specific territory, involves the delimitation of the group as a strong constituent of 
group identification. Since Fredrik Barth‘s (1969) pioneer work on ethnic identities, the 
process of ‗other-building‘ has been considered to be a basic characteristic of any kind of 
identity and a well-documented element in the analysis of nation and nationalism, as in 
Gellner‘s most famous work (1983). Here, rather than reinforcing each other national and 
European identification, are in a competitive relationship. 
This hypothesis of a dual process of identification
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 was first elaborated in reference to 
a qualitative survey on mass-level representations of citizenship conducted at the end of the 
1980s in France (Duchesne 1997). The in-depth interviews collected for this research 
suggested that two distinct models of citizenship should be considered. The first one was 
constructed around the very notion of national identity, while the second one was built in 
opposition to any form of belonging to a group, be it territorial or not — that is, in opposition 
to any form of group identification. If European integration had been nothing more than 
another stage in the individualization of societies, as Elias considers in his later work, we 
should have found Europe mentioned mostly in the second model, by interviewees reluctant 
to profess any national commitment. On the contrary, the interviewees who were more 
nostalgic of a national interpretation of history mentioned it all the more. Europe appeared to 
be a fallback position against what was not yet named ―globalisation‖. It was a defense 
against the progressive removal of national borders, considered by the same people as 
inevitable, and against the dissolution of all the elements that, from their perspective, 
constitute the basis of personal identity. But even though they were hoping for the coming 
changes, they obviously feared them also and saw the change of allegiance from their nation 
to Europe as a difficult one. In this sense, Europe was thus also clearly conceived of as an 
―imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign‖ as 
Benedict Anderson famously defined a nation.    
The analysis of the changing but well-founded relationship between national and 
European identifications presented above may be interpreted as a confirmation of the 
hypothesis elaborated with reference to the French case. Regardless of the distinctive 
character of each nation, identification with one‘s nation together with the identification in 
progress with Europe results from two distinct processes at least: one refers to the disposition 
of the individual to identify with collectives; the second relates to a possible competition 
between groups of belonging, which can, under certain circumstances, drive the individual to 
arbitrate between them. Concerning the relationship between national and European 
identifications, the first process tends to generate a positive relationship between the two. This 
is because national and European feelings of belonging feed on the same tendency to identify 
with a remote and abstract - or ―imagined‖ – group. On the other hand, the second process 
may very well give rise to a negative relationship if the two political communities, the 
national and the European, are presented as rivals. This is why the statistical relationship 
between the two indicators of European and national identification varies, according to a 
consistent pattern, from negative values in the context of public debate on Europe, when the 
arguments of Euroskeptics or ―souvereignists‖13 are loudly expressed, to almost insignificant 
values the rest of the time. This is because the two processes – the cumulative and the 
exclusive ones – have effects that may neutralize each other in the measurement of the 
statistical relationship between commitment to the nation and commitment to Europe
14
. This 
is also why different questions about national and European identifications may produce 
opposing statistical relationships between the two levels: this happens when the questions do 
not emphasize the same process at work in territorial identification. 
Let us return briefly to the introduction and the three hypotheses found in the literature 
as mentioned above: how does the interpretation above fit into that framework? Hypothesis 
one is ruled out by the empirical evidence of a persistent, although complex, statistical 
relationship between the indicators of national and European attachment.
15
 Hypotheses two 
and three actually both correspond to the two processes of identification. Depending on the 
way elites and the mass media interpret and advertise the European system in progress, 
European citizens will tend to expect either an encompassing polity aiming to complement 
and empower nations or a powerful political system competing with them for sovereignty. 
The first process – where identifying with Europe means tending to have a ‗we-feeling‘ – is 
not so much taken into consideration by the literature which it undoubtedly should be.  
This idea, that people have a variable disposition to identify with groups defined by 
territories – that is, that there are people for whom the territory does constitute a valid marker 
of identity while others are incapable of this kind of projection, should be tested with data 
including questions about the refusal of any kind of belonging. The Eurobarometers 54.1 
(Autumn 2000) and the 60.1 (Autumn 2003) provide us with new questions. In addition to the 
questions about national and European pride, we find a series of questions about the degree of 
attachment to each of the territories nested in Europe – town, region (despite the 
heterogeneity of these notions in Europe), nation and Europe
16
. The lack of antagonism in 
belonging to these nested territories can be investigated once again by a simple cross 
tabulation between these various attachments. Consequently, this will also provide 
confirmation that some respondents are characterized by a disposition to reject identification 
with any level of territorial belonging.  
 
TABLE  3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In 2003 for instance, 71.5% of the people in the sample who say that they are very 
attached to their town also say that they are very attached to their country; 79.5% of those 
who say they are attached to their region are also very attached to their country and 88.9% of 
those who are very attached to Europe are also very attached to their country. 
The correlations computed for each country (see table 3) are (almost) all significantly 
positive and are even stronger for adjacent questions. For instance, correlations between 
identification with town and region tend to be much stronger than correlations between 
identification with town and country or correlations between identification with town and 
Europe. Although the correlations between attachment to the nation and Europe are all weaker 
than the correlations between the attachment to the nation and its infra-territories, they are all 
significantly positive – apart from Northern Ireland in 2003. However, the strength of the 
correlation varies strongly from one country to another. In some places, especially Northern 
Ireland, Great Britain and Greece, the correlations between the national and the European 
level are much smaller than the correlation with local levels, while in places like East 
Germany, Denmark, or Sweden, these correlations are very similar. These results are 
consistent with the findings that Greece, Great Britain and Northern Ireland display a lesser 
tendency towards a cumulative character of national and European identities than other EU 
countries. For the UK, at least two different hypotheses can be formulated. First, the 
cumulative dimension of territorial identifications can be activated only for nested territories. 
Obviously, the UK is not perceived by most British citizens as nested in Europe, which is 
frequently referred to as being abroad. Europe remains an ―other‖, even if sometimes a 
positive one, in the British context. Secondly, the theory of cumulative identification was 
elaborated from the French case, where the national link refers very much to the territory: the 
French ―imagined community‖ is very much described in territorial terms, French soil being 
at the same time the scene of common history, the common heritage of French citizens and 
the common graveyard of French people. The first results of a comparative qualitative 
research on British national identity in England do not display the same reference to the 
British soil as being a powerful imagined link between the people. 
The hypotheses are also consistent with a general decrease in the correlations between 
the attachment to the country and to Europe from 2000 to 2003 and the contrasting variability 
in the pattern of correlations between attachment to the country, to the town and to the region, 
which seem to change quite randomly. Referring to the long term analysis of the correlation 
between national pride and the main indicator of identification with Europe, 2000 was 
considered to be a context of low intensity for antagonism while 2003, on the contrary, 
displays a high level of the antagonistic dimension between the two types of identification. 
 
Empirical evidence of the dual processes at stake in the identification with Europe 
It would be appropriate at this point to provide some evidence of the duality of the 
identification process with Europe. In order to do this, a factor analysis of all the sets of 
variables in the dataset which refer to territorial identification was computed. Both the 
Eurobarometers of autumn 2000 and autumn 2003 contain questions on the following: 
national and European pride; degree of attachment to one‘s town, region, country and Europe 
and the current indicator of European identification: ‗In the near future do you see yourself as 
(nationality) only, as (nationality) and European, as European and (nationality) or as 
European only?‘ This latter indicator was coded in two categories, distinguishing between 
respondents who say they feel « national only » and those who say they feel European in one 
way or another (see Citrin & Sides 2004 for justification). The indicator is called 
―Euronational‖. The analysis using the 2003 dataset which is more recent, but has similar 
results to those contained in the 2000 one are displayed below. 
 
CHART 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The factor analysis is a principal component one
17
 here with normalization of variables. 
Chart 2 exhibits the first two factors extracting 59,98% of the variance
18
. The circle is the 
circle of correlations (equal to one): the nearer the variables are to this circle, the more their 
inter-correlations become statistically significant. Data values on the graph come from 
Table 3. 
 TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first factor explains a little more than one third of the variance. It gathers strong and 
positive contributions from all the measures of attachment and pride (with loadings 
contributing slightly more to the factor for the national and sub-national entities). 
Euronational, which is the only indicator that records a choice between levels of 
identification, is also the only variable that barely loads on the first factor. The second factor 
contains strong positive contributions from the questions concerning Europe and negative 
(although less strong) contributions from all other questions. When the same analysis is 
carried out at the country level, the results are very similar. The same first two factors appear 
in the analysis of all countries. The interpretation of these two factors is quite straightforward. 
The first factor refers to the cumulative dimension of national and European identification, the 
social desire to belong to any available territorial group, while the second relates back to the 
exclusive dimension, to the potentially politically constructed antagonism between two 
political systems, the European and the traditional ones (nation and sub-national entities), 
competing for legitimacy. However, this competition seems a little less marked between 
Europe and nation, than between Europe and local entities
19
. 
The problem with this kind of analysis and indeed this kind of charts, is that it 
postulates a linear relationship between the items of each question. In order to check this, a 
second factor analysis was carried out, a so called ―correspondence factor analysis‖, which 
deals with items instead of variables. With correspondence analyses, two items are close if 
they represent answers given by the same or similar respondents, that is, respondents who 
give similar answers to the other questions taken into account in the same analysis (Lebart et 
alii, 2006).  
Chart 3 displays the first two dimensions. With correspondence analysis, the points‘ 
coordinates do not necessarily indicate their relative weight. The way items contribute to each 
dimension is indicated as follows: with (1) if they clearly contribute to the first factor, with 
(2) if they contribute to the second one. This indication is needed in order to decide if an item 
should be taken into account in the interpretation as its position on the chart is not enough to 
decide this. Lastly, items are represented thanks to triangles whose proportion is relative to 
the number of cases.   
 
CHART 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
On the chart, the « very » items – ―very attached to‖, ―very proud of a territorial level of 
belonging‖ – are very close to one another, more so than the other series - the ―fairly‖, ―not 
very‖ and ―not at all‖ answers. This means that there is a strong cumulative tendency with 
these items which is less the case for the other categories. Therefore, respondents who say 
they feel ―very attached to‖ or ―very proud of‖ one of their territorial communities are likely 
to feel ―very attached to‖ or ―very proud of‖ their other territorial communities too. So if 
someone says they are very proud of their nation,  they are likely to feel very proud of being 
European too, and likely to feel very attached not only to their nation, but to Europe, their 
region and town also. If they answer that they feel ―fairly ―or not very proud‖ of their nation, 
the answers regarding the other questions, and more specifically Europe, are less predictable. 
The first factor opposes the ―very‖ items concerning all levels of identification, to the 
―fairly‖ and ―not very‖ items corresponding to the national and sub-national levels only. Not 
only does this factor oppose strong positive identification to answers with less intensity, but it 
opposes a European, national and sub-national nested identification to national and sub-
national cumulative belonging which does not include Europe. 
The second factor is more complicated in that it opposes the ―fairly attached to‖ and 
―fairly proud of‖ Europe and the nation, as well as what we have called Euronationals20, to 
two series of items: on one hand, the item ―national only‖ and on the other hand, the items 
―not at all attached to‖ and ―not at all proud of Europe‖ and ―not very attached to the 
country‖. The combination Europe/nation is thus opposed to two different attitudes: on one 
hand, an exclusive attachment to the nation and on the other hand, a rejection of identification 
which is more pronounced vis-à-vis Europe than the nation. However, respondents who 
declare that they are not at all proud of their nation are actually quite rare in Eurobarometer 
surveys. 
These results confirm the first factor analysis, with the same mix of cumulative and 
exclusive identification. They provide a more complex picture of the possible combinations of 
identifications although the novelty of identification with Europe plays an important part in 
the pattern. The first factor corresponds to the process of identification with any available 
territorial community. Respondents who have a strong tendency to identify with one of them 
are thus likely to identify with any other, including Europe while those who do not tend to 
identify strongly with traditional levels of belonging do not display the same tendency to 
project themselves in newly available levels of citizenry. Indeed, feeling ―very‖ attached or 
proud corresponds to a different process than less intense feelings of belonging (Duchesne & 
Frognier, 1995).  
It is not surprising then that ―very‖ items do not load on the second factor. The second 
factor accounts for the competitive process of identification with different potential sovereign 
territories and more particularly for the competition between the new European polity and 
older national and even more sub-national political communities.  
This analysis therefore provides clear evidence of the complex combination of territorial 
attachments that result from the dual process of identification with a political community, 
especially when a new one develops. The way in which the people of Europe become 
European – in the subjective sense, i.e., develop a feeling of belonging to the EU – depends 
on what the EU means to them. For those who have a strong tendency towards a we-feeling, 
the European Union is likely to be considered as an encompassing territory in which all other 
senses of belonging are nested. For others, it is more likely to be experienced as a growing 
power, which is in competition with older sovereign political communities. In this latter case, 
the framing of Europe, the way elites and mass media in the different European countries 
account for European integration, strongly influences people‘s readiness to develop new 
allegiances and reorder their older ones. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to make sense of the paradoxical statistical relationship 
between indicators of attachment to Europe and its nations. In the literature, some authors 
comment on a negative relationship which they consider to be a sign of persistent nationalistic 
feelings while others observe a positive relationship which they interpret as the consequence 
of the complex nature of identities – nested, marbled, or multidimensional.  
We would argue that European identity should not be considered as a fact. Instead, 
attachment to Europe should rather be analyzed as a process, a process of identification with a 
new, growing potential political community
21
. As a consequence, we have proceeded to a 
diachronic analysis of indicators of attachment to any territorial levels, using Eurobarometer 
data sets. This shows over time that identification with Europe is directly related to national 
identification, and that the relationship established between these two types of identification is 
consistent, despite the fact that it changes according to the context. The changes observed can 
be interpreted as a consequence of the duality of the process of identification with territorial 
political communities.  
On one hand, identification is a process which results from the sociologically and 
politically determined individual disposition to feel like a member of a community, that is, to 
feel subjectively involved in the community or groups to which one objectively belongs. In 
this respect, nations still appear to be a powerful vehicle for the development of such a 
tendency towards a we–feeling which, in particular, can then be extended to other nested 
territories such as the European Union. On the other hand, identification results from the 
sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the 
limitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant ―other‖ 
such as the European Union. In the short term, the exclusive dimension is a direct 
consequence of the actions of national leaders who endeavor to preserve their power and 
decision-making space.  
These two processes of national and European identification interact in such a way that 
the relationship between these two levels of identification is often difficult to spot. From 1994 
to 2000, it seems possible to trace the effect of European electoral campaigns or other specific 
public debate on the EU. In such periods, the relationship between the indicators of European 
and national identification become significantly negative, while outside of these periods, the 
relationship is weaker or non significant. In these periods of public debate on the EU, the 
arguments of national anti-European activists activate potential antagonism between Europe 
and its nations. Between 1994 and 2000, the only available variable to measure European 
identification is a question which implies competition between the two levels of belonging. 
The activation of this underlying antagonism therefore has a strong influence on the 
relationship between European and national identification. In other contexts, i.e., when public 
debate on European integration is less acute, no statistical relationship between the indicators 
of national and European identification can be observed. This can be interpreted as a 
neutralization effect of both the cumulative and competitive processes at work in territorial 
identification. 
Since 2000, and the introduction of the Euro, enlargement and the European 
Convention, public debate on the EU has become recurrent. This explains why the 
relationship between the former indicators remains significantly negative. However, the 
growing number of interrogations about the nature of European civic commitment has 
contributed to introducing new questions about feelings of belonging in Europe in the 
Eurobarometer surveys. Thanks to this, over the same time period but using different 
indicators, a reversed relationship between European and national identification can be 
observed: a significantly positive one. This paradox can be interpreted as complementary 
evidence for the interpretation of the dual process of territorial identification as mentioned 
above. 
What are the consequences of these results? From a scientific point of view, it seems 
pointless to continue disputing the cumulative or competing character of national and 
European feelings of belonging: they are both empirically confirmed. It would undoubtedly 
be more appropriate to analyze the complex combination of identification processes in greater 
depth.  
From a more political point of view, this analysis aims at finding ways to promote a 
type of European identification in which Europeans feel committed to the EU without being 
exclusively so. Fear of the xenophobic and exclusive attitudes of nationalists have lead 
promoters of Europe to frame the EU as a post national, universalistic forward-looking 
concept (Soysal, 2002). The low turnout in European elections, together with a continuing gap 
between elites and working class attitudes toward the EU may be interpreted as evidence of 
the relative failure of this strategy.  
This analysis suggests that EU promoters would be well-advised to rely on time. Europe 
has a common history, geography and culture, even if history sometimes means war and 
culture sometimes means conflicting values. A more traditional, national-like framing of the 
EU, which emphasizes, these elements would benefit from a cumulative process of 
identification and secure a sense of European belonging generated  by the inclusive power of 
we-feeling created by national identities. In this context, European citizens would require 
nothing more than time to become accustomed to and feel at home in their new political 
community  
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Charts and tables: 
 
 
TABLE 1. Correlations between  measures of national pride and identification with Europe (τb de Kendall) by 
country 
 
* correlation significant at 5% ; **  correlation significant at 1% 
The samples in Luxemburg and Northern Ireland are smaller, thus the correlations are less likely to be 
significant. 
Note: a positive and significant correlation means that the more individuals are proud of their 
nationality, the more they are likely to feel European. 
Country 
1982 
March-
April 
1985 
Oct-
Nov 
1988 
Oct-
Nov 
1994 
Nov-
Dec 
1997 
March-
April 
1999 
Oct-
Nov 
2000 
April-
May 
2000 
Nov-
Dec 
2001 
Oct-
Nov 
2002 
March-
May 
2003 
Oct-
Nov 
2004 
oct-
nov 
2005 
 
Belgium  0.11** 0.03 -0.02 -0.26** 0.09** -0.07* -0.10** -0.02 -0.04 -0.13** -0.14** -0.14** -0.10** 
Denmark -0.00 0.06 0.04 -0.16** -0.07* -0.15** -0.24** -0.14** -0.19** -0.23** -0.11** -0.19** -0.16** 
West Germany 0.13** 0.06 -0.04 -0.31** -0.19** -0.20** -0.26** -0.16** -0.21** -0.26** -0.19** -0.12* -0.21** 
Greece -0.2 -0.07 -0.12** -0.04 0.02 -0.12** -0.12** -0.01 -0.17** -0.24** -0.21** -0.07 -0.11** 
Italy 0.07* 0.04 0.00 -0.13** 0.01 -0.12** -0.06 -0.01 -0.08* -0.16** -0.15** -0.05 -0.13** 
Spain - -0.01 0.08 -0.21** -0.07* -0.20** -0.25** -0.18** -0.27** -0.28** -0.25** -0.25** -0.17** 
France 0.12** 0.05 -0.04 -0.17** -0.13** -0.21** -0.16** -0.15** -0.16** -0.17** -0.17** -0.13** -0.13** 
Ireland 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.15** -0.24** -0.02 -0.22** -0.13** -0.18** -0.15** -0.22** 
Northern 
Ireland 
-0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.22** -0.10 -0.16* -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.23** -0.44** -0.42** 
Luxembourg 0.23** -0.05 -0.02 -0.09* -0.15** -0.19** -0.21** -0.13** -0.23** -0.26** -0.25** -0.25** -0.23** 
Netherlands -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15** -0.08* -0.15** -0.12** -0.18** -0.15** -0.19** -0.08** -0.19** -0.12** 
Portugal - -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.19** 0.05 -0.12** -0.16** -0.22** 0.04 -0.15** 
Great Britain -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.30** -0.19** -0.21** -0.32** -0.11** -0.26** -0.26** -0.22** -0.22** -0.20** 
East Germany - - - -0.25** -0.06 -0.18** -0.13** -0.05 -0.15** -0.18** -0.15** -0.14** -0.21** 
Finland - - - – -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.08** -0.09** -0.07 -0.03 
Sweden - - - – -0.10** -0.17** -0.18** -0.15** -0.14** -0.17** -0.16** -0.01 -0.09** 
Austria - - - – -0.06* -0.17** -0.22** -0.06* -0.14** -0.29** -0.17** -0.18** -0.14** 
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Table 2: Correlation (Kendall‘s table) between National and European pride:  
 
Country 
2000 
Nov-Dec 
2001 
Oct-Nov 
2002 
Mar-May 
2003 
Oct-Nov 
2004 
Oct-Nov 
2005 
Belgium  0.38** 0.39** 0.33** 0.29** 0.33** 0.39** 
Denmark 0.37** 0.35** 0.36** 0.35** 0.29** 0.21** 
West Germany 0.52** 0.46** 0.41** 0.55** 0.36** 0.30** 
Greece 0.27** 0.16** 0.01 0.05 0.12** 0.09** 
Italy 0.33** 0.30** 0.28** 0.33** 0.33** 0.25** 
Spain 0.39** 0.36** 0.34** 0.32** 0.36** 0.25** 
France 0.29** 0.25** 0.20** 0.21** 0.26** 0.20** 
Ireland 0.28** 0.15** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.23** 
Northern Ireland 0.23** 0.12 0.16* 0.09 0.02 -0.17** 
Luxembourg 0.42** 0.31** 0.24** 0.29** 0.33** 0.14** 
Netherlands 0.42** 0.41** 0.33** 0.33** 0.26** 0.25** 
Portugal 0.32** 0.20** 0.22** 0.19** 0.31** 0.21** 
Great Britain 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
East Germany 0.50** 0.41** 0.33** 0.40** 0.39** 0.34** 
Finland 0.33** 0.25** 0.22** 0.28** 0.28** 0.16** 
Sweden 0.38** 0.42** 0.31** 0.36** 0.42** 0.36** 
Austria 0.36** 0.41** 0.29** 0.33** 0.26** 0.36** 
 
 
TABLE 3. Correlations between measures of attachment to the nation with measures of 
attachment to the town, the region and Europe (Kendall‘s τb) by country.  
EB 54.1, Autumn 2000 
 
 
 
Country 
2000 2003 2004 
Town Regio
n 
Europ
e 
Town Regio
n 
Europ
e 
Town Regio
n 
Europ
e 
Belgium  0.49** 0.58** 0.42** 0.54** 0.61** 0.29** 0.41** 0.51** 0.36** 
Denmark 0.33** 0.30** 0.27** 0.33** 0.28** 0.21** 0.29** 0.21** 0.12** 
West Germany 0.48** 0.61** 0.47** 0.39** 0.50** 0.36** 0.33** 0.45** 0.36** 
Greece 0.55** 0.68** 0.19** 0.61** 0.74** 0.13** 0.50** 0.60** 0.14** 
Italy 0.38** 0.35** 0.33** 0.46** 0.53** 0.26** 0.50** 0.58** 0.28** 
Spain 0.43** 0.56** 0.34** 0.36** 0.45** 0.28** 0.49** 0.50** 0.33** 
France 0.49** 0.51** 0.26** 0.45** 0.55** 0.19** 0.40** 0.46** 0.21** 
Ireland 0.43** 0.55** 0.27** 0.58** 0.65** 0.20** 0.57** 0.55** 0.19** 
Northern Ireland 0.56** 0.62** 0.15** 0.48** 0.55** 0.03 0.24** 0.34** 0.14** 
Luxembourg 0.50** 0.57** 0.37** 0.50** 0.55** 0.40** 0.57** 0.59** 0.38** 
Netherlands 0.35** 0.39** 0.33** 0.39** 0.46** 0.25** 0.35** 0.36** 0.24** 
Portugal 0.66** 0.68** 0.33** 0.61** 0.68** 0.17** 0.56** 0.63** 0.25** 
Great Britain 0.34** 0.48** 0.17** 0.41** 0.47** 0.12** 0.38** 0.44** 0.09** 
East Germany 0.39** 0.50** 0.47** 0.43** 0.52** 0.40** 0.35** 0.44** 0.47** 
Finland 0.32** 0.39** 0.25** 0.39** 0.42** 0.20** 0.37** 0.44** 0.18** 
Sweden 0.39** 0.48** 0.36** 0.39** 0.47** 0.32** 0.37** 0.42** 0.30** 
Austria 0.56** 0.64** 0.38** 0.61** 0.66** 0.38** 0.45** 0.50** 0.24** 
Chart 2: Factor analysis of the variables of national and European pride, sense of belonging to 
town, region, nation and Europe and European identification (Eurobarometer 60.1, Autumn 
2003) 
 
 
Table 4: First two factor loadings 
 
 Factor 1 
(35,83%) 
Factor 2 
(24,15%) 
Nat. Pride .59 -.06 
Eur. Pride .42 .71 
Attach Town .74 -.29 
Attach Reg. .78 -.28 
Attach Country .78 -.14 
Attach Eur. .46 .67 
Euronational -.03 .74 
 
 
  
Chart 3 : Analysis of correspondences between items relative to questions on identities. 
 
 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
                                                 
1
 We wish to thank Chantal Barry (Sciences-Po, CEVIPOF) for editing this paper in English, and anonymous 
reviewers of CEP for detailed and fruitful comments. 
2
 On the contrary, this is a central and fully accepted notion in social psychology. Social psychology has strongly 
influenced the concept of European identity. See Breakwell and Lyon 1996 and Herman, Risse and Brewer 2004. 
3
 Although globalisation, growing individualism and mass immigration may contribute to eroding national 
identifications independently from European integration. 
4 
Their research tested almost fifty questions related to national identity (Michelat/Thomas 1966). The 
Eurobarometer wording is slightly different however, due in particular to the fact that the questionnaires are 
administered differently. The Eurobarometer asks ―Would you say that you are very proud, rather proud, fairly 
proud, not at all proud to be (nationality as specified in the first question)‖. While the Michelat/Thomas question 
was: ―Are you proud of being French? Circle the answer corresponding to your answer: always proud, proud, on 
some occasions, never proud.‖  
5
 Regularly, if we may say so, as the wording changed quite often. But the sense remained the same, namely: 
―Do you sometimes think of yourself not only as a (nationality) citizen but also as a European citizen? Does it 
happen often, sometimes or never?‖ 
6.‖In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and 
(nationality), European only?‖ 
7
 In Eurobarometer 64.2, the two questions were asked together with the national pride question. This confirms 
that the first European identification question, where the two levels are considered complementary, is barely 
statistically related to national pride, while the second one, where national and European identifications are 
supposed to be competitive, is significantly and negatively correlated with national pride. Obviously, part of the 
change results from  the change in measurement.  
8
 Kendall‘s tau-b is one of the most common measures of association for ordinal data. It gives an indication of 
the strength of the relationship between two questions with categorical answers, and of the sense of the 
relationship (it varies in theory between +1 and –1, but with such a data set, an absolute value of 0.4 could be 
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considered as a very strong relationship – but this is just rule of thumb), with a test of significance of the 
computed association. 
9
 It is interesting to note that this question (―In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only, etc.‖) is 
called the ―Moreno question‖, in pollster jargon from the name of a Spanish political scientist, who currently 
works on Spanish federalism but completed his PhD in Edinburgh. The conflict between nationalist regions and 
the nation-state is reflected in the question and here, extended to a potential conflict between the European 
nations and the EC.  
10
 For Northern Ireland and Luxembourg, the results are to be interpreted carefully as the samples are only 300 
and 600 people respectively. 
11
 Two students of the French national school of statistics (ENSAE), Jeremiah Just and Jonathan Lagier, have 
confirmed the structure of the relationship between national pride and European identification with a complex 
model of regression, that is, with a fully appropriate statistical tool. For a complete presentation of this 
supportive evidence, see Duchesne 2004, p.684-687. 
12
 Although we considered them at the time as two dimensions of territorial belonging: see Duchesne & Frognier 
1995. 
13
 As they would be called respectively in the UK and in France 
14
 This could also explain why L. Hooghe and G. Marks , find national identity to have negative and positive 
effect on attitudes toward integration, when applying a multi-level analysis. 
15
 At the mass level: this does not mean that it cannot be true concerning specific segments of the population, as 
for instance the free moving professional studied by Adrian Favell and his colleagues (Favell 2003). 
16. ―People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to 
Europe. Please tell me how you feel attached to your town or county, your region, your country, to Europe? Very 
attached, fairly attached, not very attached or not at all attached?‖ 
17
 Confirmatory factor analyses like maximum likelihood technique cannot be used as there is communality 
greater than 1. 
18
 The data shows that only the two first factors exhibit an eigenvalue > 1 and the “scree test” follows suit. 
19
 Facing Chart 2, one can easily see that a rotation of the axis does not change the interpretation. A “varimax” or  
an “oblique” rotation (with a correlation of .102) between the axis (as a doted line on the Chart) offers two 
factors with positive contributions of almost all the variables, but with higher loadings for national and sub-
national variables for the first factor, and for the European variables for the second vis-à-vis national related 
ones. The distinction between one cumulative factor and one oppositional becomes a distinction between two 
factors with two common cumulative components but also more pronounced loadings for the two opposite 
elements of the former second factor. 
20
 That, as we said, combines all declarations of feeling European – national and European, European and 
national, European on, etc. 
21
 Although attachment to the nations (and sub-national levels) are older, the notion of identification suits them 
better than identities do as we know that they are also the result of a learning process, acquired during the early 
socialisation phase but constantly reactivated by the media. Michael Billig provides strong evidences of this in 
Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995).  
 
 
